Non-Profit Corporations\u27 Names by Kahoe, Sheila M.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU




Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation




A NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION, like its counterpart, the profit-seeking
corporation, must have a name if it is to exist as a legal entity.1 Most
states impose statutory restrictions on the selection of a name, with
little or no distinction between the rules governing the business cor-
poration and the non-profit corporation. For example, in Ohio the two
sections of the Revised Code relating to corporate names are vir-
tually identical.2
The Ohio statute serves to illustrate the policy reasons for the
state's policing of the selection of a corporate name. Two important
considerations are set forth in the statute: first, that the name selected
shall not mislead the public, and second, that a name selected not be
so similar to that of an existing corporation as to cause confusion.3
Certain exceptions to this last provision are noted. If the pre-
viously incorporated group files a written consent with the Secretary
of State the name may be approved.4 Also, when dealing with the
merger or consolidation of two or more groups, the name of the sur-
viving or new corporation may be the same as or similar to that of
any constituent corporation. 5 A similar statutory exception is pro-
vided when a merger takes place between a domestic and a foreign
corporation.6
The state's authority to refuse authorization of a name extends
to a foreign corporation (profit or non-profit) wishing to do business
in the state. This power is considered necessary to protect the public.
It has been held that it is not an abuse of discretion to withhold
authorization even though the businesses of the two parties are so
dissimilar that they could not be confused. 7
Just how extensive the state's discretion is can be seen in the
following example. A domestic corporation filed a written consent
with the Secretary of State indicating its willingness to allow the use
of a similar name by an incoming corporation. When the Secretary
refused to authorize the use of the selected name, a mandamus action
was brought. The appellate court reversed a judgment issuing the
writ, reasoning that the purpose of the statute was to protect the
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American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U. S. 372 (1925).
2 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1702.05, 1701.05 (Page 1964).
3 Id. § 1702.05 (A) (Page Supp. 1970).
4 Id.
5 1d. § 1702.41 (B) (2).
6d. § 1702-45.
Jervis Corp. v. Secretary of State, 43 Misc. 2d 185, 250 N. Y. S. 2d 544 (Super. Ct.
Nassau County 1964).
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public as well as the domestic corporation. In this case, the court felt
that because of the nature of the business, the public might be
harmed by confusing the two corporations. So, despite the consent of
the domestic corporation, the foreign corporation was not permitted
to do business in the state under the selected name.
8
Protecting the Public
Courts have consistently held that it is the duty of the state to pro-
tect the public from deception. This consideration is of prime impor-
tance and will be weighed very heavily.9 Further, it has been held
that the action of the Secretary of State in refusing to authorize a
selected name will be reviewed by the court only when there is clearly
an abuse of discretion.10 One court in viewing the policy reasons for
protecting names has stated, "If there is no possibility that corporate
names will tend to confuse the public or mislead them in any way,
there is no reason for protection of that name."'" However, it has also
been held that it is not necessary to show actual confusion; if persons
of ordinary intelligence would likely be confused, that is enough. 2
This last interpretation is not the rule in every jurisdiction. In
a 1967 case decided in the Tenth Circuit, the court held that the deter-
mination as to whether corporate names are confusing is a question
of fact. 3 The court cited as support for their position a 1961 opinion
from the same court.' 4 Their reasoning was based on the theory that
a "greater similarity of names is allowed when the customers are
capable of close discrimination."' 5
This more sophisticated attitude, however, is not being accepted
universally. Courts continue to apply the "likely to cause confusion
test", giving less weight to evidence of lack of actual confusion.' 6
8 Investors Syndicate of America v. Hughes, 378 Ill. 413, 38 N. E. 2d 754 (1941).
0 Barber Co. v. Department of State, 277 N. Y. 55, 12 N. E. 2d 790 (1938).
10 Motor Club of America v. Curran, 193 Misc. 157, 83 N. Y. S. 2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1948),
arf'd, 274 App. Div. 1083, 85 N. Y. S. 2d 552, aff'd mem., 299 N. Y. 776, 87 N. E. 2d
678. See also National Shoe Stores Co. v. National Shoes of N. Y., 213 Md. 328, 131
A.2d 909 (1957).
5' Pilgrim Holiness Church v. First Pilgrim Holiness Church, 115 Ill. App. 2d 448, 252
N. E. 2d 1, 4 (1969).
12 First Congressional Dist. Democratic Party Org. v. First Congressional Dist. Democratic
Org., Inc., 22 Mich. App. 386, 177 N. W. 2d 224 (1970).
13 General Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. General Ins. Adjustment Co., 381 F. 2d 991, 992
(10th Cir. 1967).
14 Beatrice Foods Co. v. Neosho Valley Coop. Creamery Ass'n., 297 F. 2d 447 (D. Okla.
1961).
15 General Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. General Adjustment Co., 381 F. 2d 991, 992 (10th
Cir. 1967). See also Lawyers' Tire Ins. Co. v. Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp., 109 F. 2d 35
(D.C. Cir. 1939). Here the court points out that the more sophisticated and discerning
the customers likely to use the services of the organization, the less reason there is for
protection.
16 First Congressional Dist. Democratic Party Organization v. First Congressional Dist.
Democratic Organization, Inc., 22 Mich. App. 386, 177 N. W. 2d 224- (1970). See also
General Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Fuess, 192 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. Tex. 1961), relying
on Abramson v. Coro, Inc., 240 F. 2d 854 (Sth Cir. 1957) and Pure Foods v. Minute
Maid Corp., 214 F. 2d 792 (5th Cir. 1954).
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Use of Family Name
Ordinarily one may use his own name for business purposes.
However, in some cases the courts have been called upon to balance
the natural right of one to use his own name against the right of an
established corporation against unfair competition. The laws governing
unfair competition usually involve the passing off of goods or services
as the goods or services of another. 17 The courts have taken this idea
and formulated some restrictions on the use of family names.
An individual may not use his own name with the fraudulent in-
tent of passing his name off as that of another and thus taking ad-
vantage of another's good reputation.1 8 In some cases that deal with
this problem, the courts have extended this rule and presumed fraud
even without evidence of an actual intent to deceive, when the effect
of the use of the name has created confusion in the mind of the public
and thus has been a cause of deception. 19 One Tennessee court has gone
even further. They held that it is enough to show that the ordinary or
unwary purchaser might be confused.20
In addition, if one has a name which has already been made fam-
ous by another family (i.e., J. P. Morgan, Rockefeller, etc.) it may be
prima facie deceptive to use that similar name because of the pos-
sibility of confusion.21
Secondary Meaning
Whether the use of a family name is proper may also depend on
whether the prior use has acquired a secondary meaning because of
long use or extensive publicity. For instance, permission to use the
name "Bacardi" was refused since the name had been used so long
and had become so closely identified with the product as to be almost
synonymous. 22 Other examples of this sort of usage are readily avail-
able.
Rights Extended to Charitable Corporations
With the emphasis of the statutes and the court decisions now
primarily concerned with avoiding confusion and deception of the
public, the criteria governing the selection of a corporate name now
clearly include charitable or eleemosynary corporations. 23 Even with-
out the concept of profit-making, the good will of an organization is
deemed worthy of protection. This is especially true when the selected
17 Griesedieck Western Brewing v. Peoples Brewing Co., 56 F. Supp. 600 (D. Minn. 1944).
18Annot., 44 A. L. R. 2d 1156, 1159 (1955).
19 Id.
20 Neuhoff, Inc. v. Neuhoff Packing Co., 167 F. 2d 459 (D. Tenn. 1948).
21 H. OLECK, NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS 143 (2d ed.
1965).
22 Compania "Ron Bacardi" S. A. v. American Bacardi Rum Corp., 63 N. Y. S. 2d 610
(Sup. Ct. 1934).
23 American Gold Star Mothers v. National Gold Star Mothers, 191 F. 2d 4-8 (D.C. Cir.
1951).
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name is so similar to another as to induce membership in the latter
or to cause in any way treatment of one as the other.24 Careful con-
sideration may be given the conduct of the newcomer. If this organiza-
tion attempts to palm itself off as the earlier one or makes no con-
spicuous effort to disclaim identification with the former, use of a
similar name will certainly be prohibited.
The courts have been explicit in pointing out that the selection of
a name is restricted to prevent fraud in dealing with the public.2 6 They
are no longer solely concerned with the same as a property right.2 7
However, the protection will not be extended indefinitely. In Pilgrim
Holiness Church v. First Pilgrim Holiness Church18 the plaintiff church
sought to enjoin the defendant from using the words "Pilgrim Holi-
ness" in its name. In this case, the plaintiff church had previously
merged with another church and was now known as the Wesleyan
Church. Because a considerable amount of property (in trust) was held
for the plaintiff, it was argued that the defendant should not be al-
lowed to use the name, despite the fact that the plaintiff no longer
used the name. The Court of Appeals of Illinois found that nothing
in the record indicated that the plaintiff in any way retained the use
of the name. This, concluded the court, was an effective abandonment
of the name and thus the defendant could not be enjoined from using
the designation "Pilgrim Holiness" as a part of its name.29
Geographic, Generic and Descriptive Names
Ordinarily, exclusive rights to a name which is geographic, generic
or descriptive will not be given.30 In 1888 the United States Supreme
Court set forth this basic proposition of law.31 Mr. Justice Field, writ-
ing for the Court, reasoned that "no one can claim protection for the
exclusive use of a trade-name or trade-mark which would practically
give him a monopoly."3 2 This same case also prohibited the exclusive
use of geographic names. As of the date of this writing, this decision
rendered in 1888 is still good law.
There are exceptions to this general rule, however. By special
statutory provision some names are restricted from general use.33
24 Most Worshipful Jiram of Tyre v. Most Worshipful Sons of Light, 94 Cal. App. 2d 25,
210 P. 2d 34 (1949).
2- American Gold Star Mothers v. National Gold Star Mothers, 191 F. 2d 489 (D.C. Cir.
1951).
-G Pilgrim Holiness Church v. First Pilgrim Holiness Church, 115 IlI. App. 2d 448, 252
N. E. 2d 1 (1969).
2,7 Id.
28 Id.
_9 Id. at 7.
30 18 AM. JuR. 2d Corporations § 148 (1965).
3' Goodyear India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U. S. 598 (1888).
32Id. at 603, citing Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311 (1871).
32 H. OLECK, supra n. 21 at 145.
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Names such as United Nations, Mason, Bank, Insurance, Union and
numerous others, may be restricted in toto or made available only with
the permission of the appropriate authority.
A further exception applies to the use of generic or geographic
terms if an intent to deceive can be shown.34 In Lincoln Center for the
Performing Arts, Inc. v. Lincoln Center Classics, Record Society, Inc.3 5
it was held that despite the argument that "Lincoln Center" is a geo-
graphical location, the name would be protected since the evidence
showed that the name was adopted "with intent to acquire or obtain
for personal or business purposes a benefit or advantage. ' 36
This idea of deliberate misrepresentation in the use of a generic
term was explored recently in a New Jersey case. One Frank Grohsman
began operating an animal dealership under the name Humane Animal
Shelter (Center) of New Jersey, Inc. Suit was brought by several local
and national humane societies on the theory that the use of the word
"humane" constituted a fraud upon the public at large since it delib-
erately misrepresented the true character and nature of the defend-
ant's operation.3 7 In this case, the court did not rely on the theory of
unfair competition in fashioning its decision. Here it was dealing with
a charitable (non-profit) corporation seeking to enjoin the use of a
generic term, claiming that the defendant's use of the term damaged
the reputations of the several plaintiffs (and all others similarly
situated). Note that the damage claimed was to reputation, although
the court commented that there was also a possibility of financial harm
to the plaintiffs by way of decreased membership and/or contribu-
tions.38
After exploring the meaning which the general public commonly
places on the word "humane," the court found that the defendant's
business did not conform to the concept of "humane" as understood by
the public and upon which the public relies. The defendant was there-
fore found to be "through the use of the word humane in its title ...
foisting a fraud upon the public."39 An injunction was granted because
the court felt that the public would ultimately be damaged because
of the misrepresentation inherent in the use of a generic term which
normally would not be restricted.40
Several states have provided for this type of situation by statute.
New York and Massachusetts, for instance, impose criminal penalties
for the fraudulent use of a name which so nearly resembles that of
34 Id.
35 25 Misc. 2d 686, 210 N. Y. S. 2d 275 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
36 Id. at 277, citing N. Y. PENAL LAW § 948 (McKinney 1967).
37 National Catholic Society of Animal Welfare, Inc. v. Grohsman, No. C-1842-70 (N. J.
Super., April 6, 1971).
38 Id. at 7-8.
39 Id. at 7.
40 Id.
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a benevolent, charitable, humane or fraternal organization as to
deceive the public.4 1
Reservation and Change of Name
Generally, a person may reserve a name for a proposed new cor-
poration by submitting to the Secretary of State a written application
for the exclusive rights to use such name. Some states have extended
this statutory provision to allow this right to non-profit corporations
as well.4 2
When applying for reservation, if the Secretary of State finds
the name is available, he will endorse the application. The applicant
then has the exclusive rights to the use of the selected name reserved
for 60 days. During this time the applicant may, if he chooses, transfer
these rights by filing with the Secretary a written notice of the trans-
fer including the name and address of the transferee.4 3
Similar provisionsa are set forth for any corporation or non-profit
corporation wishing to change its name.4 4 General corporation law
recognizes no power in the corporation to change or alter its name
except through the formal procedures set forth in the controlling
statutes.4
5
There is some question as to the effect on the corporate existence
in the event of an illegal or unauthorized name change or alteration.
Some courts have held that the corporate identity is not destroyed, but
rather becomes a partnership, with the officers and stockholders liable
as partners.4 6 The opposite conclusion has been reached in other
jurisdictions following the theory that abandonment of the name is
equal to the abandonment of the corporation itself.4 7
An authorized change of name has the same effect as the name
change of a natural person. It does not change the corporation's liabili-
ties under the old name.4 ' However, it allows the corporation to con-
tinue its operation under a new name.
Remedies
A general rule of law states that a corporation, profit or non-
profit, chooses its name at its own peril.4 9 A corporation having prior
41 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 71A (1966) ; N. Y. GEN. Bus LAW, Art. 9-B § 135 (Mc-
Kinney 1968). See also N. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW Art. 26 § 397 (McKinney 1968).42 E. q., OHIO REv. ConE ANN. § 1702.05 (C) (Page Supp. 1970); CALIF. CORP. CODE 310
(West 1955) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.10 (Smith-Hurd 1954) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 1203 (1967).
43 OHIo Rsv. Cone ANN. § 1702.05 (C) (Page Supp. 1970).
44 Id.
45 Pilsen Brewing Co. v. Wallace, 291 Ill. 59, 125 N. E. 714 (1919).
46 Id. See also Richard v. Minnesota Savings Bank, 75 Minn. 196, 77 N. W. 822 (1899)
Robinson v. First National Bank, 98 Tex. 184, 82 S. W. 505 (1904).
47 Cincinnati Cooperage Co. v. Bate, 96 Ky. 356, 26 S. W. 538 (1894) ; Senn v. Levy, 111
Ky. 318, 63 S. W. 776 (1901) ; Stafford National Bank v. Palmer, 47 Conn. 443 (1880);
Annot. 8 A. L. R. 583 (1920).
as Michigan Ins. Bank v. Eldred, 143 U. S. 293 (1891).
49 American Order of Scottish Clans v. Merrill, 151 Mass. 558, 24 N. E. 918 (1890).
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rights to a name may ask for an injunction against the new corporation
to prevent its use of the name.50 This protective remedy is equally
available to non-profit corporations.5 1
The injunction, however, will issue only if the name is so similar
as to cause confusion in the public mind. As discussed previously, the
reason for the protection is twofold: first, to protect the public, and
second, to protect the corporation from unfair competition.
Because the relief is equitable in nature, the courts have been
careful to scrutinize the likelihood that the public will be misled and
the extent to which the complaining party is likely to be injured."
A slightly different question of liability may arise in cases where
the Secretary of State's office accepts and files a name which in fact
conflicts with a presently existing and previously certified corporation.
The New York court recently dealt with this problem. 53 An employee
of the Secretary of State accepted and filed a certificate for Baron
Decorator's, Ltd. This corporation was later informed that a corpora-
tion named Baron Decorating Service, Inc. had been incorporated (in
compliance with all statutory requirements) some 31 years earlier.
The new corporation was then required to go through the statutory
name change procedures. This corporation tried to bring an action
in negligence against the employee and the state. The New York Court
of Appeals found that the accepting or rejecting of a corporate name
is a quasi-judicial act requiring the exercise of discretion, and thus
the state was immune from suit despite the damage to the party forced
to change its corporate name. 4
Conclusion
The use of a corporate name has caused the courts some small
problems in the past. With the rapid growth in the area of non-profit
corporation law, 55 the likelihood is that even more judicial interpreta-
tion of the use of corporate names will soon be required. Because of
the unique function of the non-profit corporation, the chances for
abuse and misuse of names is great. It may be desirable to masquerade
as a "charitable" organization. How simply this could be accomplished
if one could freely select a name which implied "good deeds." Ob-
viously the opportunity for misleading the public is present. "The
danger is that non-profit corporations, partly because of their char-
50 American Gold Star Mothers v. National Gold Star Mothers, 191 F. 2d 488 (D.C. Cir.
1951).
51 Parma Democratic Club v. Democratic Club of Parma, Inc., 29 Ohio L. Abs. 30 (8th
Dist. Ct. App. 1939).
52 18 Am. JUR. 2d Corporations § 148 (1965).
53 Gross v. State of N. Y., 33 App. Div. 2d 868, 306 N. Y. S. 2d 28 (1969).
54 Id.
5 Lesher, The Non-Profit Corporation-A Neglected Stepchild Comes of Age. 22 Bus.
LAW 951 (1967).
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itable character, have a public image which can be usurped by being
used as fronts for illicit interests." 56
If the general public relies on a name which implies a charitable
purpose, and then discovers that the name is deceptive, faith of the
public in all charitable organizations is undermined. 57
The name of a corporation, profit or non-profit, gives the organ-
ization a legal identity. This identity should be maintained with the
highest degree of integrity possible, and that integrity should begin
with the corporate name.
56. Id. at 966.
57 This is not to suggest that this writer is equating charitable and non-profit corporations,
but is merely using the charitable corporation as an example of this class.
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